Drowning not waving: after 40 years of neglect, what now should be done to develop police intelligence practice in Britain? by James, AD
Drowning not waving: after 40 years 
of neglect, what now should be done 
to develop police intelligence 
practice in Britain? 
 
BSC Policing Network at https://bscpolicingnetwork.com/2016/10/07/drowning-
not-waving-after-40-years-of-neglect-what-now-should-be-done-to-develop-police-
intelligence-practice-in-britain/ 
 
 
I have been studying police intelligence practice for about 16 years (see 
James, 2016, 2014, 2012, and 2003). It has been a fascinating, intriguing, and 
frustrating journey in almost equal measure. Perhaps the thing I have found most 
frustrating is that after more than 40 years of scholarly research, police-led research 
and ‘official’ inquiries into criminal intelligence work, that practice looks very much 
the same today as it did in 1975. 
 
The Audit Commission (1993) was a significant actor in stimulating interest in the 
subject, but insider-led scrutiny of criminal intelligence work began with the Baumber 
Inquiry (ACPO, 1975). This was followed by the Pearce Report (ACPO, 1978); the 
Ratcliffe Report (ACPO, 1986), the 1997 report Policing with Intelligence (HMIC); the 
Bichard Inquiry (Home Office, 2004); the  National Intelligence Model Review (to 
which I made a small contribution) (ACPO, 2014) right the way through to Building 
the picture: An inspection of police information management (HMIC, 2015). These 
are some of the most significant inquiries but I doubt this is an exhaustive list.  
 
Of course, some things have changed. There is increasing specialisation in criminal 
intelligence work as well as a proliferation of intelligence assessments and sundry 
other analytical products. But, largely, these changes are presentational. Even if they 
have shaped practice at the margins, I question whether they have influenced policing 
in anything other than the most superficial of ways. Certainly, what really mattered to 
Baumber (and to a great extent to both Pearce and Ratcliffe) in terms of the 
development of a suitably professional and capable intelligence workforce – a 
collective vision for intelligence; common understanding of the intelligence basics; 
improved training and selection procedures that put the best and most experienced 
staff into those important positions – have not been delivered. I argue that is because, 
despite the rhetoric to the contrary, the institution has never truly accepted the case 
for them. 
 
In previous publications, I have attributed this to human factors; the negative impacts 
of institutional conservatism, managers’ self-interest and professional subcultures 
(see James, 2016). I have also reflected on the extent to which there is an identity crisis 
in the intelligence world; left to its own devices has it lost sight of its raison d’etre? 
Perhaps, it is able only to focus on its own part of the business, without concerning 
itself with the external realities; the police organization’s unswerving commitment to 
action over reflection, its rejection of existentialism in favour of pragmatism. It may 
be more accurate to say that an indifferent executive has not allowed it to concern itself 
with those external realities by side-lining it from meaningful involvement in the 
decision-making process – that certainly was a significant factor in the story of the 
NIM (see James, 2013).  
 
I remain convinced that these realities are hugely significant factors in this 
environment and are detrimental to the development both of the work and the 
workforce but the more I reflect on the issues, the more I wonder if these are just very 
obvious symptoms of bigger problems rather than the problems themselves. Recently, 
I have been exploring that idea with a colleague from the Finnish Police University. 
Our dialogue increasingly has focused on classic analyses of bureaucracies. Weber 
(1947) argued that bureaucracies are wired to become increasingly specialized 
precision instruments. Largely, their aim is not to fit better with the pieces of a larger 
puzzle but to achieve excellence in their own right. When the task is unclear, the 
bureaucracy loses its identity and floats without purpose. Perhaps, that is where the 
intelligence world finds itself today. Weber said that to exercise control, bureaucratic 
administrations relied on a combination of technical and experiential knowledge, 
which itself was a product of the “‘striving’ for power”, characteristic of bureaucratic 
organisations (1947 p.339).  
 
By that analysis, arguably, what we are witnessing here in the intelligence milieu is a 
natural development of the institution in which significant efforts to reshape 
the status quo through ‘revolutionary’ schemes such as: the first recorded intelligence-
led policing initiative, the Aberdeen Policing Experiment; the Unit Beat Policing 
experiment of the 1960s, the Kent Policing Model (the precursor of the NIM) and the 
NIM itself (see James, 2013), have consciously (or unconsciously) been disdained for 
fear that in the long run they may have unknown and unintended consequences, more 
detrimental to the institution or to the individuals who wield power within it or to the 
communities it serves (not necessarily in that order). 
 
Both Robert Reiner (2012) and Ben Bowling (2007) have argued persuasively that we 
should recognise the limits of policing. Bowling suggests that ‘good enough’ policing 
is as much as we reasonably can expect from the institution. Should we apply that same 
caveat to police intelligence practice? I am in complete agreement with Reiner and 
Bowling on the need for a kind of reality check on police capabilities but it seems to 
me that ‘good enough’ is only an acceptable aim when it can be demonstrated that the 
organisation and its individual members actually are doing their best, working 
efficiently, effectively, and ethically to provide the services that stakeholders and 
communities expect and need. For all the energy expended by the institution in the 
context of crime and criminality, the evidence suggests that it may be working hard 
enough, but in failing to make the best use of its intelligence, it is not working smart 
enough. As the reader has seen, identifying the root causes of these inefficiencies will 
be difficult; as the last 40 years have shown, resolving them may be much, much 
harder. 
 
